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C OMMENTS
STATE JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS
By RICHARD E. JOHNSTON*
Introduction
Is magazine or television solicitation of business sufficient to provide a
state with jurisdiction over the soliciting foreign corporation?' Not too
long ago, the answer clearly would have been no. But within the past ten
or fifteen years there has been a general re-examination of the concepts
providing a state in personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations. This
has been accomplished by both legislative enactment and judicial inter-
pretation. The trend is clearly a liberalizing one, permitting states and
their courts greater jurisdiction. It is the purpose of this article to present
the history of this aspect of jurisdiction, to give the recent Supreme Court
decisions which announce the liberalizing trend, and to determine Cali-
fornia's position in this matter.
History of the Problem
The original concept upon which judicial jurisdiction was founded
appears to be that a court could summon before it only a person who could
be served with the court's process within the jurisdiction in which the
court sat.2 Thus, an action affecting persons beyond the geographical area
of control of the court was a nullity.3 These were the prevailing English
concepts during the period in which our United States were being formed.
The Constitution does not specify the limits of the power of the state
courts, and it might be infered that the Constitution retains the state's
previous jurisdiction.4 This limitation of jurisdiction was a self-imposed
one and was a feature of the system for almost a century. With respect to
each other, the states operated largely as states of the world rather than as
a union.5 Only when recognition of a judgment was sought in another
state, under the full faith and credit clause, did the Constitution require its
enforcement.' But there was no direct supervisory authority or constitu-
tional limitation until adoption of the fourteenth amendment in 1868.
The Constitutional limitations were clearly set forth in Pennoyer v.
* Member, Second-Year Class.
1 "Foreign corporation" is used in the sense that the corporation was incorporated under
the laws of a state other than the forum state.
2 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
3 Buchan v. Rucker, 9 East. 192 (K.B. 1808).
4 Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State Courts Over Non-Residents in Our Federal System, 43
CORNELL L.Q. 196 (1957).
5 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839) (comity between states and
nations).
6 D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850).
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Neff. 7 It was held that a tribunal's authority is necessarily limited by the
state's territorial boundaries in which it is established, any further assump-
tion of jurisdiction being excessive. Where the object of the court action is
one to determine rights and obligations of the defendant, an action in
personam, constructive service is ineffectual, and it makes no difference if
the process is published within the state or sent to him out of state.8 Thus
Pennoyer v. Neff would require presence within the state to acquire juris-
diction in personam'
A different problem arises as to foreign corporations. Under the earliest
theories, a corporation could not be sued outside the state of its creation.1"
But since it was also established that a foreign corporation was not entitled
to the protection of the privileges and immunities clause, there developed
the doctrine that a state could impose certain conditions on a foreign cor-
poration before being privileged to do business within its borders. 1 A
primary requirement was that the foreign corporation appoint an agent
within the state for accepting service of process, thereby "consenting" to
jurisdiction. 2 But a problem arose immediately if the foreign corporation
was in fact doing business within the state or if it was doing only interstate
business and thus not subject to being excluded by the state (since that
power was given to Congress by the commerce clause), and yet had failed
to appoint the agent.' In Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French,4 the Supreme
Court resolved the difficulty by the following rationale. Since a foreign
corporation's right of entry to do business was conditional upon the appoint-
ment of an agent to receive process, and yet the foreign corporation was
doing business, it was therefore implied that the corporation had ap-
pointed the prescribed agent. Service was then allowed upon the agent of
the corporation as being effective upon the corporation under an implied
consent.' 5
Due process limitations upon such service of foreign corporations were
set forth in 1882 in St. Ckir v. Cox.'6 Since a foreign corporation was only
"present" in a state through the activities of its agents and the corporation's
"implied consent" to the assertion of jurisdiction was directly dependent
upon business activities within the state asserting jurisdiction, due process
795 U.S. 714 (1877).
8 Id. at 727.
9 But see Dambach, Personal Jurisdiction: Some Current Problems and Modern Trends,
5 U.C.LA.L. RFv. 198 (1958).
10 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839) (dicta).
11 Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440 (1931).
12 GooDRiCH, CoNFicT oF LAWS § 76 (3d ed. 1949).
13 International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914) ; Henrietta Min. & Mill. Co. v.
Johnson, 173 U.S. 221 (1899) ; STUMBERG, CON=r-CT Or LAWS 86 (2d ed. 1951).
14 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).
15 Even though consent was implied through the use of legal fictions, "... more realistically,
it may be said that those authorized acts were of such a nature as to justify the fiction." Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). Also see Smolik v. Philadelphia &
Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 Fed. 148 (S.D)N.Y. 1915).
16 106 U.S. 350 (1882).
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required that the corporation actually be doing business within the forum
state before there is any consent implied or corporate "presence."17
Another problem situation arose where the foreign corporation had been
doing business within the forum state but had withdrawn all its agents
before the summons could be served. The remedy was to enact a statute
providing for service of process upon a designated state official. Authority
was deemed to have been given by the foreign corporation's doing business
within the state.' 8 Under such a statute, if the cause of action arose out of
the business activities within the state, service upon the specified state
official was sufficient, even if there was no further attempt to notify the
corporation of the pending action. 9
As judicial jurisdiction over foreign corporations evolved, the state was
limited only by its voluntary restrictions, either judicial or legislative, and
the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment.' These limita-
tions were directly related to the requirement of doing business within the
state. If the corporation was not doing business, no matter how adequate
the notice of suit, it was an illegitimate assumption of jurisdiction. The
question really became: Just what activity within the state will constitute
doing business so as to render the corporation amenable to jurisdiction?
The question has more significance if it is first determined for what purpose
jurisdiction is sought. It might be for purposes of determining the power
of the state to impose local taxation, whether the corporation is subject to
the state's regulatory powers, or whether jurisdiction exists for service of
process and amenability to suits within the state. Such business activity as
may satisfy for one purpose may not satisfy for another."
Through the United States Supreme Court the activities required to
constitute "doing business" were set forth, although a definitive rule was
impossible.2 It was clear that the residence of the foreign corporation's
official alone would not provide jurisdiction.' Also jurisdiction was denied
upon the service of the president-purchaser of a foreign corporation while
on a buying trip in New York upon an action for breach of contract arising
from a previous buying trip there.24 And even though a wholly owned
subsidiary sales corporation was unquestionably present within the state,
an attempt to prove the parent corporation was doing business in the state
17 People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918) ; Philadelphia &
Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y.
259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
18 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 6500-6504.
19 Washington v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361 (1933).
20 23 Am. Jug., Foreign Corporations, § 360; 22 CA. JUR. 2d Foreign Corporations § 34.
21 Jeter v. Austin Trailer Equip. Co., 122 Cal. App. 2d 376, 265 P.2d 130 (1953); Caplin,
Doing Business in Other States, United States Corporation Company (1959). This article con-
cerns amenability to suit within the forum state.
22 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914) (each case to be decided
on its own facts).
23 Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1923) ; cf. Consoli-
dated Textile Corporation v. Gregory, 289 U.S. 85 (1933).
24 Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
failed.25 But jurisdiction was allowed where one person owned and operated
both corporations,2 or where the parent was only a holding corporation."
Another area of controversy developed over the quantity of business
which had to be carried on by the foreign corporation before its "presence"
in the state would be recognized.
When the activities had been "continuous and systematic," and gave
rise to the cause of action sued on, the corporation was "present," regard-
less of the fact that no consent or authorization to an agent to accept
service had been given. l But where there were only single or isolated acts
within the state and the cause of action did not arise from such activity,
it was not present or doing business so as to give the state jurisdiction.2
If there were only single or isolated acts, but the cause of action was
connected with such activity, the general rule might be said to be that the
state gained no jurisdiction.30 And while there were some cases in which
continuous activity within a state was not enough to support jurisdiction
of causes of actions arising elsewhere, 3' there were others in which the
activity was of such a nature, in addition to the continuous and systematic
aspect, that suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely
distinct from these activities were allowed.3 In arriving at these decisions,
the quantum approach was most evident when the primary activity of the
corporation was the solicitation of business by agents. Attempting to set
forth the required activity that would sustain jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court developed the "solicitation plus" rule. The rule was that mere
solicitation is insufficient to indicate presence within a state3 3 And where
the court desired to support jurisdiction there was found "solicitation plus"
other activities. 4
The quantitative basis for analysis of the finding of "doing business"
remained until 1945.
Internation-al Shoe Doctrine
In International Shoe v. Washington 5 the Supreme Court re-examined
the previous decisions concerning personal jurisdiction and then announced
a more liberal concept. Here the foreign corporation was engaged in the sale
25 Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
26 Cf. Henderson v. Rounds & Porter Lumber Co., 99 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Ark. 1951).
27 See, e.g., Mas v. Orange Crush Co., 99 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1938) ; Industrial Research
Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 29 F.2d 623 (N.D. Ohio 1928).2 8 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914) ; Pennsylvania Lumber-
men's Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U.S. 407 (1905) ; Connecticut Mutual Co. v. Spratley,
172 U.S. 602 (1899).
29Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907).
30 Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923).
31 Simon v. So. R. Co., 236 U.S. 115 (1915) ; Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 205 U.S. 530
(1907) ; cf. Davis v. Farmer's Co-operative Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923).3 2 Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
3Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 205 U.S. 530 (1907).
34 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 US. 579 (1914).
35326 US. 310 (1945).
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of shoes through the soliciting activities of eleven local salesmen. These
employees were supplied with samples which they displayed to retailers
sometimes in semi-permanent offices rented for this purpose. When orders
were received they were transmitted to St. Louis for acceptance and the
merchandise was shipped f.o.b. from points outside Washington. These
salesmen did not make collections nor had they the authority to contract
for the company. The State of Washington sued to recover contributions
under the state Unemployment Compensation Act.
The Supreme Court upheld the state court's finding of sufficient contact
to sustain jurisdiction. This result was not so surprising in itself,36 but the
rationale and the change in emphasis by the Court was. Hereafter, the
quality of the acts within the state were to be analyzed and not the quantity.
In announcing this rule the Court said:37
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between
those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and
those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative. The test
is not merely ... whether the activity ... is a little more or a little less.
[citing cases] Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly adminis-
tration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to
insure. [Emphasis added.]
And speaking of the constitutional limitations when subjecting a non-
resident corporation to suit, the court held:3 8
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to ajudgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts With it such that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.'
The Court laid down other important ground rules. In deciding upon
the "fair play" requirements, it would be relevant to "estimate the incon-
veniences" in requiring a foreign corporation to defend in a suit away
from its home or principal place of business.39 This element appears to be
one aspect of the doctrine forum non conveniens which, in application,
would act as a counterbalance to the liberalized requirements for contact
within the state. The Court further reasoned when a foreign corporation
exercises the privilege of conducting business activities within a state, it
not only enjoys the benefits and protection of that state's laws, but incurs
obligations. And if these obligations arise out of the activities within that
36 Although it might be difficult to reconcile the decision with previous ones, i.e., Minne-
sota Commercial Men's Ass'n v. Benn, 261 U.S. 140 (1923); People's Tobacco Co. v. American
Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918). But see Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511 (D.C.
Cir. 1943).
37326 U.S. at 319.
38 Id. at 316.
3 9 Id. at 317. See also Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALiF. L. REv.
380 (1947).
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state, it cannot be said undue should the state enforce them by suit.40 Thus
the "presence" theory was discarded; in its stead was placed the "minimum
contact" or "fair play and substantial justice" theory.4 1
Subsequent Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court has encountered this jurisdictional problem several
times since the International Shoe case. In Traveler's Health Ass'n v.
Virginia' 2 the foreign corporation was engaged in the mail order health in-
surance business. The Association had no paid agents in Virginia but relied
upon the recommendations of its members there. Upon such recommenda-
tions, the defendant would mail solicitations to the prospects and applica-
tion forms for acceptance by the company in Nebraska. It had also investi-
gated claims within the state. The state brought action under a "Blue Sky"
law requiring the obtaining of a permit from the state before selling securi-
ties. Service was by registered mail. The corporation appeared specially
to quash service, but the Virginia court denied the motion, and the United
States Supreme Court affirmed. The Court stressed the corporation's creat-
ing of "continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another
state," the "consequences" and degree of interest the state had in the con-
tracts, and ruled that such contact was sufficient to warrant jurisdiction. 3
In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.44 there was a suit against
the foreign corporation in which the cause of the action did not arise out
of the activities in that state. Defendant was a Philippine mining corpora-
tion and temporarily carrying on its general business activities, on a very
reduced scale, in Ohio during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines.
The activities included directors' meetings, payment of salaries, and pur-
chasing of machinery. The Court held that the due process clause did not
prohibit Ohio from asserting in personam jurisdiction over the corporation
for the corporation's activities there satisfied the "fair play and substantial
justice" formula.
Then the Court in 1957 demonstrated just how far, in the corporate
field, due process limitations are from those set forth in Pennoyer. McGee
v. International Life Insurance Co.45 upheld a California statute which pro-
vided substituted service in an action against a foreign insurer of a citizen
of California. 6 In that case, the solicitation by a Texas insurance company
was by mail to the California resident and was the only solicitation within
the state. The plaintiff contracted for insurance through correspondence,
40 326 U.S. at 319.
41 See Rutledge, J., in Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946), in which he
interprets the case as holding that regular and continuous solicitation constitutes "doing
business," contrary to previous notions.
42339 U.S. 643 (1950).
43Accordi Hoopeston Canning Co..v. Cullen, 318 US. 313 (1943); Osborn v. Ozlin, 310
U.S. 53 (1940); contra, Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n v. Benn, 261 U.S. 140 (1923).
44 342 U.S. 437 (1951).
45355 U.S. 220 (1957).40 CAL. INS. ConE §§ 1610-1620.
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and premiums were all paid by mail. Upon the insured's death the bene-
ficiary, after the company refused to pay, brought suit, serving the corpora-
tion by registered mail under the statute. Upon obtaining judgment in the
California courts, the plaintiff filed the judgment in Texas. The Texas court
held that the California courts did not have jurisdiction,4 7 but the United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the suit was based on a con-
tract which had a substantial connection with California and was a type of
transaction in which the state had a particular interest and regulatory
power. As far as the decision goes in liberalizing the "minimum contact"
rule, it is interesting to note that the court's opinion was unanimous.
Perhaps the McGee case reached the limits of due process and personal
jurisdiction. The next decision on the question resulted in reversal of a
Florida court which had found sufficient contact to give jurisdiction.
Hanson v. Denckla8 concerned a Delaware resident who established a
trust with a Delaware corporation as trustee, with life estate for herself,
but reserving a power of appointment either inter vivos or testamentary in
the remainder. She later moved to Florida, became a resident, and subse-
quently exercised the power of appointment. Upon her death her will was
probated in Florida. The residue of the estate, after specific grants, was
devised to certain persons, but the amount of property passing under this
clause depended directly upon the effectiveness of the appointment. Under
Florida law it was ineffective, and the trust res passed by the will. How-
ever, the trustee-foreign corporation did not appear and the validity of the
judgment rested upon whether there was sufficient affiliation with the
state by the trustee to warrant jurisdiction. Chief Justice Warren, speaking
for five members of the Court, held that the Florida courts lacked jurisdic-
tion in personam over the trustee corporation because of insufficient con-
tacts with the state prerequisite to the exercise of power over it.
But can this be said to be a retreat from the expansion of personal
jurisdiction over non-residents? By looking at the facts upon which the
Court distinguished the McGee case, it appears not. First, it must be remem-
bered that the majority found that the effectiveness of the initial establish-
ment of the trust, long before the deceased became a domiciliary of Florida,
was the transaction questioned. The cause of action then did not arise "out
of an act done or transaction consummated in the foreign state."49 This
might be a clue that more substantial activities are required when the
cause of action arises elsewhere. Second, and perhaps more important,
there was no solicitation of business in Florida either by mail or in person.
The Court stated in this regard:"
47 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 288 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. 1956). The Texas court gave
much weight to the fact that the statute involved was enacted after the solicitation and the
insurance was contracted.
48 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
49 Id. at 251.
5 0 Id. at 253.
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• [I] t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activi-
ties within the forum state thus invoking the benefits and protection of
its laws.
Third, the Court noticed that Florida had not enacted special legislation
to indicate its "manifest interest" in protecting its citizens from non-
residents' activities which the state regarded as subject to special regula-
tion as had California in McGee. 1 One other point should be noticed. The
"minimum contact" and "estimate of conveniences" do not appear to be
"either-or" tests. Both are to be satisfied. As the dissenting opinion points
out, it would have been more convenient to litigate in Florida,52 but the
majority opinion rests squarely on the first test (minimum contact) not
having been satisfied.
These Supreme Court decisions allow greater freedom to the States than
ever before in subjecting foreign corporations to jurisdiction by local
courts. From these cases, we can garner several very general rules as to
the limitations of the due process clause. The foreign corporation must first
do some act within or directed toward the forum state by which it seeks
a commercial transaction. This act or transaction may be by mail only. If
the cause of action arises from this act or transaction, then this may be
sufficient to constitute the required minimum contact. Should the cause of
action arise elsewhere and independent of the act or transaction within the
foreign state, more substantial activity would probably be required. And
once the minimum contact with the forum state is satisfied, then there must
be a weighing of the conveniences so that assumption of jurisdiction would
not violate the due process tenets of "fair play and substantial justice.153
But such highly generalized rules are of little value when we remember
that "[t]he analysis of specific fact situations in the light of traditional
rationalization continues to be essential." 54
The California Position5
As seen, within the limits of the commerce and due process clauses of
the Constitution, each state is free to establish its own rules regarding the
competency of its courts to assume jurisdiction over foreign corporations.
A state legislature may exercise its authority up to the limits or, as many
seem to do, content itself with the same jurisdiction it was allowed prior to
International Shoe.5 6 Generalities on the various states' interpretations of
51 Id. at 252.
52 Id. at 262.
53 Cf., Note, 47 GEo. LJ. 342, 351-52 (1958).54 E=NzwEIG, ColN'ucT oF LAws § 28, p. 94 (1959).
55 See generally, Dambach, Personal Jurisdiction: Some Current Problems and Modern
Trends, 5 U.CLA.L. REv. 331 (1958); Horowitz, Bases of Jurisdiction of California Courts to
Render Judgments Against Foreign Corporations and Non-Resident Individuals, 31 So. CAL.
L. REy. 339; Comment, Suing Foreign Corporations in California, 5 STr". L. Rzv. 503 (1953).
56 See, e.g., Ames v. Senco Products, 146 N.Y..2d 298 (App. Div. 1955). See also McGriff
v. Charles Antell, Inc., 123 Utah 166, 256 P.2d 703 (1953).
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"doing business" requirements are of limited value. Therefore, considera-
tion and study must be given to the statutory and case law in the particular
jurisdiction concerned.57
In California the bases of the competence of state courts to render
valid judgments against foreign corporations are spelled out in provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure,58 Corporations Code,59 and Insurance
Code.6" We have already seen the application of the Insurance Code provi-
sions in McGee. Application of the other Code provisions have been no less
"liberal," and these applications have indicated a desire to exercise juris-
diction over foreign corporations up to the very limits allowed by the
Supreme Court decisions.
The California Code of Civil Procedure provides for suit against a
"foreign corporation . . . doing business in this state."'" This section has
been interpreted by the California Supreme Court, in Henry R. Jahn &
Son v. Superior Court, as embodying only such limitations as are required
by the due process clause.62
Therefore, the test for application of the statute is not a definition of
"doing business" but rather whether there would be a violation of the due
process clause if jurisdiction were allowed.
The case of Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, with opinion by
Justice Traynor, gives a good discussion of the application and considera-
tions to be given the various factors outlined in International Shoe. In that
case Jahn & Son, a New York company, was the exclusive marketing agent
for American Drying Systems and another California manufacturer. Jahn
ordered from American by mail or telephon from New York. The goods
were shipped to a California forwarding company who was selected and
instructed by Jahn. American brought an action in California against Jahn
and the other California manufacturer alleging a conspiracy to take over
his business. After quoting from International Shoe, the court said: 63
Whenever litigation arises out of business transactions conducted across
state lines between parties whose principal places of business are in differ-
ent states, there may be hardship to the party required to litigate away
from home. There is no constitutional requirement, however, that this
hardship must invariably be borne by the plaintiff whenever the defendant
is not deemed present in the state of plaintiff's residence. In some circum-
stances there is adequate basis for jurisdiction when the defendant has
elected to deal with the plaintiff even though only by mail.
57 For a r~sum6 of recent decisions of various states, see Caplin, Doing Business in Other
States, United States Corporation Company (1959).
58 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 411.
59 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 6500-6504.
60 CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1610-1620.
61 CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 411.2.
6249 Cal. 2d 855, 858, 323 P.2d 437, 439 (1958). "Whatever limitation it imposed is
equivalent to that of the due process clause." See also, Eclipse Fuel Engineering Co. v. Superior
Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d 736, 307 P.2d 739 (1957).
63 49 Cal. 2d at 860, 323 P.2d at 441.
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In Carl F. Borgward G.M.B.H. v. Superior Court64 the California
Supreme Court had occasion to affirm the "liberal" interpretation and
application of "doing business." There the defendant German corporation
shipped automobiles and parts to a California independent importer with
title passing in Germany. Borgwards' agent visited California for several
days three separate times within a two year period to negotiate contracts
with local distributors. The Court found Borgward was "doing business"
by undertaking to protect and promote its market in California through its
agent, and by reaping the benefits of the local market and having access
to the local courts.65
The more recent case of Florence Nightingale School of Nursing v.
Superior Court66 appears to go even further in allowing jurisdiction over
a foreign corporation inasmuch as all contact within the state was only by
mai6T and did not involve an area of special regulation as McGee did. The
facts of that case were that the defendant foreign corporation was adver-
tising its correspondence course of nursing in nationally circulated maga-
zines. The advertisements solicited inquiries by mail of those interested,
and in answer to such inquiries they were sent literature and application
forms. When application was made, the nursing school would distribute
lessons and materials to the student who, upon completing the lesson, would
mail it to Chicago for correction and return. The number of California
students was less than one percent of the defendant's entire enrollment.
A California resident brought an action alleging unfair competition. The
court took notice of the later Supreme Court decisions and in a well
reasoned opinion found that the foreign corporation was "doing business"
so as not to violate the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."
The court noted the analogy of the facts and those in Traveler's Health
Ass'n v. Virginia, supra. However, it must be remembered that that case
dealt with one of the areas (insurance) in which a state has particular
interest and the action was brought under a special regulatory statute. This
does not mean to suggest the analogy was not a strong one, nevertheless.
There were strong cases cited while finding that the correspondence school
has its situs not only at the place at which its offices were located, but also
at the location of its various students.64
64 51 Cal. 2d 72, 330 P.2d 789 (1958).
65 The court also removed doubt of § 6300 of the Cal. Corp. Code controlling §§ 6500-6504
which would have restricted § 411 of the Code of Civ. Proc. to apply only to those corporations
doing intrastate business, thereby precluding service upon corporations doing interstate and
foreign commerce. This had been suggested in an opinion in Gordon Armstrong Co. v. Superior
Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d 211, 325 P.2d 21 (1958).
66168 Cal. App. 2d 74, 335 P.2d 240 (1959).
67
'Petitioner has never had any office, postal address, telephone listing, bank account,
property, agents, solicitors, or other representatives in California." 168 Cal. App. 2d at 77,
335 P.2d at 242.68 International Textbook v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910) ; International Textbook v. Gillespie,
229 Mo. 937, 129 S.W. 922 (1910) ; Air Conditioning Training Corp. v. Majer, 324 Ill. App.
387, 58 N.E.2d 294 (1944). Contra, Reed v. LaSalle Extension University, 156 F.2d 575 (D.C.
Cir. 1946).
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The "mere solicitation" or "solicitation plus" rule was discussed despite
a finding that there was "solicitation plus" by the foreign corporation in
arranging for and carrying out the courses of instruction. The court noted
that there has been great dissatisfaction with that rule69 and that later
courts had interpreted the recent decisions as denouncing the rule.
But what might be considered the biggest step toward securing juris-
diction is the indication that it makes no difference whether the solicitation
be made personally or through magazine advertising. In this regard, the
court stated :70
There is no essential difference in the activity or in the results between
solicitation by agents in the state and solicitation by advertising in maga-
zines circulated in the state. Solicitation by advertising may be more pro-
ductive of business than by agents. These days it would seem that there is
much more solicitation by advertising in newspapers, magazines, and over
radio and television than by any other method.
Should we equate advertising by magazine, newspaper, radio, and television
with the personal solicitation by agent, a large barrier will be removed from
the continued expansion of the personal jurisdiction of state courts. If such
advertising should result in contracts with residents of the state, it seems
only just that causes of action resulting from such contracts be heard in
that state at the risk of the corporation's expense, rather than the indi-
vidual's.7 The corporation has initiated the contact with the state by his
soliciting activities. The methods used in the solicitation should not be
determinative of jurisdiction.72
Another area to consider is where the cause of action does not arise out
of the business activities within the forum state. The California courts
passed on this question in both Koninklijke L. M. v. Superior Court73 and
Jeter v. Austin Trailer Equipment Co.74 In the first of these two cases an
action for damages was brought arising from a plane crash in England.
KLM had offices in California both for the purchase of equipment and sale
of tickets. The court held that the foreign corporation was "doing business"
within the state, that it had jurisdiction over a transitory action, and that
it was immaterial that the cause of action was unrelated to any of the
business conducted here. In the second case this view was followed when
there was a sale of an allegedly defective wheel manufactured by the foreign
69 See the persuasive argument by Justice Rutledge in Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134
F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
70 168 Cal. App. 2d at 78, 335 P.2d at 243. Accord, Wanamaker v. Lewis, 153 F. Supp. 195
(D. Md. 1957) (purchase of time on local radio station). But see, Schmidt v. Esquire, Inc., 210
F.2d 908 (7th Cir. 1954) ; McGriff v. Charles Antell, Inc., 123 Utah 166, 256 P.2d 703 (1953).
71 Cf. Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951) ; Johns v.
Bay State Abrasive Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950) ; McBaine, Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Corporations: Actions Arising Out of Acts Done Within the Forum, 34 CAT i. L. REv. 331
(1946).
72 See Justice Black's dissent in Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, 345 U.S. 663, 667 (1953).
73 107 Cal. App. 2d 495, 237 P.2d 297 (1951).
74 122 Cal. App. 2d 376, 265 P.2d 130 (1953).
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corporation, the cause of action arising in Arizona. The defendant had a
solicitor in the state maintaining continuous and systematic activities, plus
keeping merchandise in California and filling orders from local stock. The
court held that the corporation was "doing business" within the state, and
that "[i] t is now established that, absent serious inconvenience to defend-
ant or other equitable considerations, there is no constitutional limitation
precluding the assumption of jurisdiction over [transitory] causes of
action by the courts of a state in which a foreign corporation is doing
business .75
Normally, a foreign corporation has some form of sales representative
within the state by which it disposes of its product. This sales representative
may appear in the form of a subsidiary corporation, an employee, an agent,
or an independent wholesaler. Each may appear also with varying degrees
of control exercised by the foreign corporation. Earlier cases emphasized
that if the sales representative were an independent contractor, the foreign
corporation was not "doing business.176 But more recently, the California
courts have held that agency is just another of the factors to consider,77
and that the test is a comparison of the advantages of such methods of sale
with those that would be achieved by the foreign corporation's own sales
force.78
The one area in which California appears to have more stringent
requirements than the constitutional interpretations of due process would
call for is where the foreign corporation has withdrawn from the state.
The California statute79 provides that to serve process upon a withdrawn
foreign corporation it must first have transacted intrastate business in
California8 ° and, secondly, the cause of action must have arisen out of
such business.81 Seemingly a foreign corporation engaged solely in inter-
state business would escape the state's jurisdiction if it has withdrawn
before service of process. Since the expansion of state court jurisdiction is
7 5 Id. at 389, 265 P.2d at 138. The recent case of L. D. Reeder Contractors of Arizona v.
Higgins Industries, 265 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1959) does not appear to go this far. There a
Louisiana corporation was held to he not doing business in California through a distributor
here. A sale was made through the distributor with the goods shipped directly to Arizona.
The opinion gives an excellent view of the current trends but refuses jurisdiction. There is
reliance in part upon several New York decisions which are of doubtful value to California law
inasmuch as New York has chosen to retain the same jurisdiction bases it had prior to
International Shoe. Ames v. Senco Products, 146 N.Y.S.2d 298 (App. Div. 1955).
78 See, e.g., Jameson v. Simonds Saw Co., 2 Cal. App. 582, 84 Pac. 289 (1906).7 7 Eclipse Fuel Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d 736, 307 P.2d 739 (1957) ; Knee-
land v. Ethicon Suture Laboratories, 118 Cal.App. 2d 211, 257 P.2d 727 (1953) ; Iowa Mfg. v.
Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 2d 503, 246 P.2d 681 (1952). Contra, Estwing Mfg. Co. v.
Superior Court, 128 Cal. App.2d 259, 27 P.2d 146 (1954); Martin Bros. Electric Co. v.
Superior Court, 121 Cal. App. 2d 790, 264 P.2d 183 (1953). And see CAT. CORP. CODE § 6301.
78 Sales Affiliates, Inc. v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 2d 134, 214 P.2d 727 (1950).
79 CA.. CORP. CODE § 6504. Also see Oro Navigation Co. v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. App. 2d
884, 187 P.2d 444 (1947).
80 Defined by CAL. CORP. CODE § 6203 as "entering into repeated and successive trans-
actions of its business in this State, other than interstate or foreign commerce."
81 Confidential, Inc. v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. App. 2d 75, 320 P.2d 546 (1958) ; Holt-
kamp v. States Marine Corp., 165 Cal. App. 2d 131, 331 P.2d 679 (1958).
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stymied in this area, review by the state legislature with a view toward
amendment or repeal is suggested.
8 2
Another question frequently encountered is whether jurisdiction exists
where the cause of action arose out of a mere isolated act committed in
the state by the defendant. It has indeed been held that such contact may
satisfy the requirements, particularly in suits involving motorists83 and
special regulatory powers. 84 Perhaps McGee stands for this proposition,
since there is language in the opinion which is not limited to such areas.85
However, it is questioned whether jurisdiction resulting from a single, iso-
lated act could be maintained under the present California statutes unless
the courts were to give a more flexible interpretation as to when the foreign
corporation need be doing business within the State. If the corporation is
required to be doing business at the time of service of process, as earlier
cases have indicated,86 and the contact with the state is only a single act,
more than likely the corporation will have withdrawn by that time. Then,
unless the court desires not to consider it as such, the corporation will fall
under the demanding requirements of service upon a withdrawn corpora-
tion discussed above. If considered desirable by the legislature, passage of
a statute similar to those in other states providing jurisdiction over such
single, isolated acts is suggested. s
Conclusion
From International Shoe to McGee we have witnessed a great expan-
sion in state jurisdiction over foreign corporations or, stated conversely, a
"relaxation" of the due process requirements necessary to render a valid in
personam judgment. And Hanson v. Denckla does not appear to be a
withdrawal from this trend. Whatever limitations it imposes, tremendous
latitude is allowed those states which choose to expand their jurisdiction
over such corporations. However, for even the most desirous states, nation-
82 See Horowitz, Bases of Jurisdiction of California Cour ts to Render Judgments Against
Foreign Corporations and Non-Resident Individuals, 31 So. CAL.. L. REV. 339.8 3 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
84 Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
85 ". . . a trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state
jurisdiction over foreign corporations.... In part this is attributable to the fundamental trans-
formation of our national economy over the years. Today many commercial transactions touch
two or more States and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With this increas-
ing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted
by mail across state lines. At the same time modern transportation and communication have
made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages
in economic activity." 355 U.S. at 222-23.
86 Davenport v. Superior Court, 183 Cal. App. 506, 191 Pac. 911 (1920) ; Jameson v.
Simonds Saw Co., 2 Cal. App. 582, 84 Pac. 289 (1906). But see Koninklijke L. M. v. Superior
Court. 107 Cal. App. 2d 495, 237 P.2d 297 (1951).
87 VT. Rv. STAT. § 1562 (1947), applied in Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116
Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS, art. 23, § 88(d) (1951), applied in
Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950), and Compania de
Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943
(1955); ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-340 (1947); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 110, § 17 (1957).
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wide service is not yet allowed as territorial lines still basically mean
jurisdictional lines.88
The argument against the continued expansion of jurisdiction over
foreign corporations is the hardship placed upon the defendant who is
forced to defend away from its principle place of business or "home." Some
courts feel that fear of the "hardship" of defending away from home will
have an adverse effect upon the business activity within a state by foreign
corporations voluntarily limiting themselves, to local activities or intrastate
business.8 9 The detrimental effect upon the states' markets is an interlink-
ing consideration.
But the very reason for the expansion answers the plea of hardship.
The "fundamental transformation of our national economy, increased
nationalization of our commerce, expanded interstate business through
the mails, and highly improved transportation and communication"9 10 have
reduced the possible inconvenience of distant litigation from the major
consideration it once was. Today's distant state is as close as yesterday's
adjacent county. Remembering that the first test, i.e., the "minimum con-
tact" or some deliberate act within the state by the defendant, must be
satisfied, then the second test of relative hardship, through transportation
and communication improvements, decreases in weight. Because of these
improvements and the promise of even greater advances in these areas, even
further expansion of the state courts' jurisdiction over foreign corporations
can be foreseen.
88 See Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fiber Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
89 See the dissenting opinion of Schauer, J., in Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, 49
Cal. 2d at 863, 323 P.2d at 442. "Such a holding seems especially unfortunate and undesirable,
particularly for the manufacturers and producers of California, as it must inevitably tend to
deter those in the market for California products from sending to this state for them." See
also Wolfe's, Ch. J., concurring opinion in McGriff v. Charles Antell, 123 Utah 166, 169, 256
P.2d 703, 705 (1953) ; Funk, The McGee Case and the Banks, 14 Bus. LAW. 737.
9 O Caplin, Doing Business in Other States, United States Corporation Company (1959).
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